



**Mrgendragama: sections de la doctrine et du yoga, avec la vr̥tti de  
Bhattanarayanakantha et la dipika d'Aghorasivacarya. Traduction,  
introduction et notes**

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Śivopādhyāya when he applies these categories to the meditations which that tantra enumerates. But it is Silburn not Śivopādhyāya who has misunderstood Abhinavagupta's painstaking definitions. It must suffice here to point out that she fails to distinguish between the first and highest 'means' (*śāmbhavopāya* or *icchapāya*) in which the yogin centres himself in the pre-discursive impulse (*icchā*) to cognition and action without the intervention of thought (*akiñciccintaka*), and the second (*śāktopāya* or *jñānopāya*) in which the yogin, incapable of approaching consciousness from a point so close to its undifferentiated essence, resorts to the field of cognition (*jñāna*), intensifying a 'truth'-perception ('I am omniscient', 'I am omnipotent', 'This universe is the expansion of my own identity', etc.) to the point of direct revelation (*sākṣātkāra*) unmediated by thought. Now Silburn omits all reference to this defining 'truth'-perception and makes Abhinavagupta's definition of this process, which he calls *vikalpasamskāra* (*Tantrāloka* 4.2), apply to all cognitive and affective states (p. 13, ll. 11-25) without distinction, and from this error it is but a short step which leads her to the statement that the yogin in *śāktopāya* 'can turn to his advantage the paroxysmal climax of such emotions as terror, anger and passion . . .' (p. 13, ll. 26-28). Clearly she has in mind here *Spandakārikā* 1.22 which Kṣemarāja aptly connects with *Vijñānabhairavatāntra* (Śivopādhyāya's recension), 101. Now the practice which the latter (and, by implication, the former) delineates belongs not to *śāktopāya* but to *śāmbhavopāya*, for it involves the obliteration of the act of thought within the spontaneous upsurge of non-cognitive states of intense emotion. As Śivopādhyāya, the last reliable Trika exegete, puts it, 'this is the *śāmbhava* plane because it is achieved without the intervention of a thought-act' (*esā nirvikalpaupayiki śāmbhavi bhūh*). As for *śāmbhavopāya* itself, which because of the encroachment of her *śāktopāya* now lacks any clear identity of its own, she divides it into two levels (p. 12, ll. 25-30) on the basis of a mistranslation of Kṣemarāja's *Spandanirṇaya* (p. 19, ll. 16-20). She makes him say that *udiyama*, the primal upsurge of pre-cognitive power which is the domain of *śāmbhavopāya*, is firstly *sevanā* ('un hommage assidu') and secondly 'a return to perfect interiority'. The Sanskrit (glossing *udiyamena*) is *paripūrṇāntar-mukhasvarūpasevanātmanā*. It is knowledge not of Śaiva doctrine but of Sanskrit language which tells us that her second level has been conjured up, against the laws of grammar, out of a simple description of her first.

The translation of the *Vimarśinī* (pp. 33-112) is far from exact, though generally her familiarity with Śaiva doctrine saves her from 'heresy' when she misconstrues the Sanskrit. Thus on 1.2 (. . . *svasvātantryaśaktiābhāsitasvarūpagoṇanārūpayā mahāmāyāśaktiā* . . . ' . . . by his power 'Mahāmāyā', i.e. by that concealing of his true nature which his own autonomous agency manifests') Silburn gives (Sanskrit parentheses mine) ' . . . grâce à sa libre énergie (*svasvātantryaśaktiā*), afin de voiler sa véritable nature (*svarūpagoṇanārū-*

*payā*) spontanément lumineuse (*ābhāsita* -!) (le Seigneur se sert) de l'énergie de la grande illusion . . .'. Orthodox, but not exactly what Kṣemarāja said.

The 'Analysis of the Śivasūtras and their commentary' (pp. 113-82) which ends the work summarizes the translation and, rightly abandoning any attempt to treat the *Vimarśinī* as a text of an independent school, elaborates certain details by drawing on the Trika and Pratyabhijñā literature of the author's famous teacher. Thus she achieves in her exegesis the *sāmarasya*, the sameness of flavour, which she so admires in the spiritual vision of the Kashmirian non-dualists.

ALEXIS SANDERSON

MICHEL HULIN: *Mṛgendrāgama: sections de la doctrine et du yoga, avec la vytti de Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇakaṇṭha et la dīpikā d'Aghoraśivācārya. Traduction, introduction et notes.* (Publications de l'Institut Français d'Indologie, No. 63.) ix, 387 pp. Pondichéry: Institut Français d'Indologie, 1980.

Nothing so much reveals the inappropriateness of the expressions 'Kashmir Śaivism' or 'Śaivism of Kashmir' for the syncretistic Trika of Abhinavagupta and the various non-dualistic Śaiva texts and traditions on which it draws (Spanda, Pratyabhijñā, Kula and Krama) as the fact that Kashmir was at the same time the scene of a vigorous school of Śaiva dualism (based on the canon of the twenty-eight āgamas) which produced a corpus of scriptural commentaries and independent treatises to which the so-called Southern Śaivism looked for the rigorous formulation of its authority. The current use of these expressions would have seemed impertinent to the Siddhāntin dualists, but it would also have embarrassed the non-dualist Śaivas of Kashmir, particularly those of the inclusivist Trika school, for whom the doctrines of their dualist compatriots and the āgama-canon on which they were based were always the object of reverent study and front-line quotation.

The present work is to be warmly welcomed as the first translation into a European language of a detailed text belonging to this tradition, and the inclusion of the sub-commentary of Aghoraśiva, the illustrious Siddhāntin of the Cola country places before a wider public rich evidence of the formative influence of the Kashmirian school on the Śaiva theology of the South.

In a regrettably brief *avant-propos* (pp. v-ix) the author modestly summarizes his predecessors' evidence for the dates of the *Mṛgendrāgama* (*terminus post quem*: A.D. 300), the Kashmirian Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha (tentatively, eleventh century) and Aghoraśiva (mid-twelfth century). The second can, however, be dated more precisely; for his son and pupil Rāma-kaṇṭha II whose upper limit was fixed hitherto by Aghoraśiva's references to him, is quoted by Kṣemarāja (c. 1000-1050) (*Netratantrod-dyota*, vol. 2, p. 285). Since, as Hulin points out (p. vi) his father Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha quotes

Utpaladeva (c. 925–975), father and son must have been roughly contemporary with Utpala's pupil Lakṣmaṇagupta (c. 950–1000) and Kṣemarāja's teacher Abhinavagupta (c. 975–1025), respectively.

Comparing the two commentators he considers the Colan more 'provincial and sectarian' (p. vi). He contrasts Aghoraśiva's narrow learning with Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's familiarity with the *Svacchandatantra* and *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* which he describes as the favourite scriptures of the non-dualists. It is perhaps true that the Śaiva culture of Kashmir in Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's time was more diversified and more 'brilliant' than that of Aghoraśiva's Cola deśa; but it is doubtful that it was less sectarian simply because Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha quotes the tantras mentioned. Kṣemarāja lets us know that his motive in writing a non-dualist commentary on the first was to displace a well-established dualistic interpretation (*Svacchandatantrōddyota*, vol. 6, p. 146). As for the second, it is so deeply permeated by Saiddhāntika doctrines (in particular that of the seven 'knowers') that for Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha to quote it was to assert possession of a sectarian colony long established. The quotations, then, are not necessarily signs of broadmindedness. Indeed, while Kṣemarāja was defending the *Svacchandatantra* from the dualists, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's son, his older contemporary, was protecting the *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama* from non-dualist infiltration from the camp of the Kaulas (*Mataṅgapārameśvarāvṛtti* (ed. N. R. Bhatt), pp. 1 and 41). As for Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's quotations from Utpaladeva's *Īśvarasiddhi*, which Hulin might have used to serve his argument, it should be borne in mind that that work is explicitly formulated along the lines of the dualist system (v. 56c<sup>2</sup>d).

The translation follows two editions, that of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (1930) with the *vṛtti* alone (K) and that published from Devakoṭṭai (1928) (D) with both *vṛtti* and (*vṛtti-ḍīpikā*). Unfortunately discrepancies have not been systematically recorded in the notes. Readers who, like the reviewer, have no access to the extremely rare D can none the less see that this is so in unambiguous cases. Thus the translation (p. 10) demands *daśātmajan* and *sudhākhyasya* where K has the inferior readings *drśātmajan* and *śivākhyasya* (p. 8, ll. 3 and 5). Such cases, however, constitute a small proportion of all the deviations from K and even if, to be generous, the majority of the others are genuinely based on readings in D and are not errors of translation, there are cases where the translator has overlooked K at the expense of intelligibility. Thus on pp. 14–15 of K Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha has the Śaiva ṛṣis protest to a 'mimāṃsaka' Indra who tests their faith, that not only smṛti but also śruti backs up their cult. They say, in K, '*tad āsatām tāvat . . . pavarāṇīkyah samhitāh . . . yāsām idaṃ tātparyam . . . tatrāprāmāṇyam abhyupagamyāpi brūmo yadabhiprāyenedam abhidhīyate sa tāvac chrutyartha eva smaryatām*', i.e. 'Leave aside . . . the Purāṇic texts . . . which do indeed testify (to the orthodoxy of our practice) . . . ; (for) even if we accept that they are without authority we will point you to the import of

the very *śruti* with reference to which you put your case'. Hulin has (pp. 19–20) 'Nous admettons cela mais (il existe) certains types d'anciennes collections de textes sacrés (*pavarāṇīkyah samhitāh*) . . . qui justifient notre (culte particulier). . . Tout en admettant votre point de vue (reading *tatra prāmāṇyam* in K) nous déclarons: "Quant à ce dont vous parlez dans une certaine intention (critique) (*abhiprāyena*) c'est le contenu même de la Révélation (védique)'" (English and Sanskrit parentheses mine.) A kindly reader will assume that for K's *āsatām* (lit. 'let them rest') the translator saw *āstām* in D and stuck to it with unfortunate results.

Yet this work, if not always completely reliable as a translation, is none the less a valuable contribution, making available an abundance of new material for those who, lacking adequate Sanskrit, wish to be better informed on the speculative and yogic aspects of dualistic Śaiva tantrism. Those whose Sanskrit exonerates them from working from translations will none the less find much to interest them in the notes and will be grateful for his careful identification of quotations from often unpublished texts. Both, however, will be obliged to make their own indexes.

ALEXIS SANDERSON

EGON BRUCKER: *Die spätvedische Kulturepoche nach den Quellen der Śrauta-, Ṛgḥya- und Dharmasūtras: Der Siedlungsraum.* (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, hrsg. vom Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens an der Universität Hamburg, Bd. 22.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1980. DM 80.

The Aryan conquest and colonization of the greater part of the Indian subcontinent was a protracted process extending over the best part of a thousand years. The detailed history of this movement was not recorded, but its general outlines can be followed by a study of the geographical names which happen to be recorded in the successive strata of the Vedic texts. In the R̥gveda the Aryans are still confined to the north-western part of the subcontinent, while in the Brāhmaṇas the occupied area has been extended to include the territory known later as Madhyadeśa. A further extension is to be seen in the Sūtra period, by the end of which most of the area which is now linguistically Indo-Aryan had come under Aryan domination.

Egon Brucker's book is concerned with the evidence of the last of these three periods, and it consists of a detailed study of the names of countries which find a mention in this literature. By using the *Vaidika-padānukrama-kośa* it has been possible to provide an exhaustive list. A comparison of these lists from the sūtras with those in the Brāhmaṇas is provided from which it is possible to see that a very great extension has taken place in the period covered by these texts. At the same time it is worth noting that no reference to any Dravidian country is as yet found. It is true that